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ABSTRACT: People argue to reconcile differences of opinion, but reconciliation may fail to happen. In 
these cases, most theorists assume arguers are left with the same disagreement from which they started. 
This is too optimistic, since disagreement might instead escalate, and this may happen because of the 
argumentative practice, not in spite of it. These dangers depend on epistemological, pragmatic, and cultural 
factors, and show why arguers should be (and are) careful in picking their dialogical fights. 
 






The idea that arguing helps people to reconcile their differences of opinion has great 
prominence in argumentation theories. Some approaches, like pragma-dialectics (van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst 1992; 2004), consider this to be the main purpose of every 
argumentative practice, whereas other theorists see it as the leading goal of a specific type 
of argumentative dialogue (Walton and Krabbe 1995; Walton 1998), or as one of the key 
functions of argumentation, albeit not the only one (Gilbert 1997; Johnson 2000). Being 
argumentation a fallible practice, it is admitted that reconciliation may not happen, and 
this is taken to indicate a failure of the dialogical interaction. But it is usually assumed 
that, in these sad cases, the arguers are left with the same disagreement from which they 
started, and nothing else. 
 I suggest this description of argumentation failure is far too optimistic, since many 
cases of everyday debate turn out to be much unhappier. As a case in point, consider the 
all too familiar case of a married couple, who start idly debating what would be the best 
color for the new tapestries, and half an hour later find themselves bitterly quarrelling on 
who is to blame for their inability to agree on the small things of life. As this example 
illustrates, there are circumstances where the level of disagreement escalates during the 
argumentative interaction, instead of diminishing. Moreover, and this is the provocative 
thesis defended here, the escalation of disagreement happens because of the 
argumentative practice, and not in spite of it. Daniel Cohen (2005) has made a somehow 
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similar point with reference to the transfer of credibility from premises to conclusions 
that arguments are supposed to ensure: he showed that not only this transfer may fail to 
happen, which is obvious, but also that bad arguments can backfire and end up 
undermining the credibility of the conclusions they intended to support. Here I explore a 
different way in which argumentation can backfire, not in terms of its effect on the 
credibility of the conclusions, but in its impact on the level of disagreement among the 
arguers. 
 One of the few argumentation theorists to mention escalation of disagreement as a 
typical danger of arguing has been Jean Goodwin.1 She puts it very succinctly, remarking 
that “the most salient consequence of the joint activities involving arguments is to make 
the participants mad: this is at least a widely held ordinary view of the function of 
argument” (2007, p. 76). Here she is making two empirical claims: that disagreement is 
the most typical consequence of an argument, and that most people perceive it to be so. 
Goodwin provides some evidence of the latter, e.g. showing that it is very easy to elicit 
such view from students (2005; additional evidence can be found in Martin and 
Scheerhorn 1985; Hample and Benoit 1999), but she does not pursue the former claim 
any further—understandably so, since the point is mentioned in passing within a broader 
criticism of the functional approach to argument analysis. In what follows, I argue that 
Goodwin is partially right also in her first claim: “partially right” here means that (i) 
disagreement can indeed escalate (ii) due to argumentation, and not in spite of it; but (iii) 
this is not enough to prove the empirical claim that disagreement is the most likely 
outcome of argumentation, and indeed I believe this not to be the case, although the 
matter will not be further discussed here. Instead, I will insist on the strategic relevance of 
argument-induced disagreement, trying to show that arguers consider very carefully the 
possibility of fueling disagreement with the counterpart, in deciding whether to argue or 
not.2 
 This line of reasoning has important connections with the broader agenda of 
psychological research on argumentation practices (for an excellent overview of the field, 
see Hample 2005). In particular, the work on argument editing done by Hample and 
colleagues (Hample and Dallinger 1990; 1992; Hample et al. 2009) is of special 
relevance here. Editing is supposed to intervene between private conception of a message 
and its public manifestation: when the arguer’s primary goal and his background 
knowledge spontaneously suggest him a possible argument to foster his position, he can 
decide whether or not to make use of that argument—and this is what Hample and others 
call an editorial decision. Editing can invite either suppression or revision of the message, 
for a variety of reasons: the empirical work done in this area has investigated exactly 
what these reasons are. In what follows, and in particular in section 3, I will address a 
similar problem, discussing how the arguer’s expectations on disagreement may prompt 
him to make different decisions in argumentative engagement. 
 However, with respect to editing, my concern here is at the same time broader and 
narrower. It is broader in the sense of considering the decision to engage in 
                                                 
1 Another is Deborah Tannen (1998), who takes for granted that an “argument culture” is one in which 
confrontation and fighting are constant threats and, to some extent, inbred forms of social engagement. 
2 This analysis is thus in the vein of, and largely compatible with, what has been called an individual-level 
analysis of argumentation (Jackson 1992) or, more recently, the design approach (Goodwin 2001; see also 
Kauffeld 1998; 2002; Manolescu 2005; 2006). 
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argumentation at all, whereas editing usually applies to single arguments, under the 
assumption that the subject is already arguing and has to decide how to proceed. But the 
scope of this paper is also narrower, because I confine myself to expectations of 
disagreement as a strategically relevant element, while studies on editing explore a 
greater variety of strategic considerations. In spite of this difference, readers will notice a 
substantial overlapping between the factors presented in section 3 and some of the 
editorial standards identified by Hample and colleagues, in particular those labelled as 
“person-centered” (Hample and Dallinger 1990; 1992). This is not surprising: it stands to 
reason that people, in making strategic decisions on their argumentative practice, use 
similar criteria both locally (should I use this particular argument in this dialogical 
interaction?) and globally (should I argue at all in this social situation?). Further studies 
will then be needed to (i) empirically verify the global effects on argumentation of the 
criteria discussed in this paper, and (ii) better integrate this analysis within a 
comprehensive psychological account of argumentative practices. 
  
2. REASONS OF DISAGREEMENT: WHY ARGUING DOES NOT ALWAYS HELP 
 
On the view defended here, disagreement is not just an unfortunate event that happens 
independently from argumentation and that arguments sometimes fail to mend. We 
consider a stronger claim: that argumentation can be conducive of disagreement, due to 
its very nature and to the conflicting agendas of the arguers. Arguing can engender 
escalation of disagreement mainly due to four factors, which are complementary and do 
not exclude each other: 
 
(1) Epistemological factor. Your having different opinions from myself is understandable 
and legitimate, but refusing to accept what I consider valid reasons is easily taken to 
indicate stubbornness and lack of cooperative disposition. That is, disagreement on 
unjustified opinions is more easily condoned than disagreement on justified opinions. The 
very fact of engaging in argumentation raises the stakes for social interaction: before 
arguing, we could both believe to be right, and yet remain vague on many important 
points, e.g. what reasons made each of us convinced of different things, whether these 
reasons were valid or not, where was the (alleged) mistake in the line of reasoning of our 
counterpart, etc. But arguing is tantamount to investigating head-on all these issues, so 
that we are no longer just stating our view and refusing to yield to the other, but also try 
to prove the other wrong, e.g. dissecting and criticizing his position point by point. 
 Another way of putting this idea is in terms of merely disagreeing vs. finding fault 
in the other’s reasoning. Pre-argumentative disagreement usually starts in substantial 
ignorance of each other reasons to endorse opposing views, and this leaves room for 
tolerating the disagreement itself as faultless (see also Kölbel 2003): for all I know of 
what you know, you may have good reasons to differ from my opinion, even if this leads 
you to wrong conclusions. As far as mutual respect is concerned, ignorance can indeed be 
a blessing. In contrast, arguing forces both parties to uncover the reasons of the 
counterpart and to reveal their own, so that ignorance of each other reasoning can no 
longer serve as an excuse. This has the effect that, if no agreement is reached on the 
original issue, the parties usually end up considering each other both mistaken and 




(2) Costs/benefits factor. Arguing requires the subject to suffer some costs, in terms of 
time, breath, cognitive resources, social exposure, plus what economists call opportunity 
costs—all other things I could have done, if I was not stuck here arguing with you. These 
costs steadily increase as a function of argument duration: the more we argue, the more 
resources we have to commit to it. The benefits of arguing, however, often do not have 
the same dynamics. Take persuasion as a case in point: if I stand to gain something from 
persuading you, whatever benefit I hope to achieve is independent from the time I spend 
achieving it, whereas the costs are not. The same applies to negotiation dialogues, while 
other types of argumentative interaction may have different dynamics. Following here 
Walton’s taxonomy for the sake of clarity (1998), in inquiry and eristic confrontation 
benefits are likely to increase proportionally with the time spent arguing: the more we 
argue, the more we improve our understanding of the topic (inquiry), or the more we vent 
our feelings towards each other and/or manage to hurt each other (eristic confrontation).3 
So in these cases the extra costs suffered may be more than compensated by the 
additional benefits of prolonged discussion. As for information-seeking dialogues and 
deliberation, in these cases benefit dynamics depend mainly on the details of the 
situation: if the information I seek is quite specific, the sooner I get it the better, whereas, 
if I have broader curiosities, extended discussion may be more beneficial; similarly, if we 
are deliberating on something specific for which we know all the relevant facts, 
efficiency favours a relatively short discussion, whereas, if the issue is more complex, 
prolonged debate may be the best option. 
 Let us now focus on instances where costs are likely to increase while benefits 
remain stable over time, e.g. in persuasion and negotiation. Here prolonged 
argumentation is usually not in the agent’s best interest, and this effect is cumulative: the 
more efforts I devote to convince you, the more I stand to lose if, at the end of the day, 
you are not convinced. This may have a twofold effect on the likelihood of disagreement 
escalation. On the one hand, it makes arguers increasingly disappointed, since what 
appeared at the onset as a good deal is turning into an expensive mess from which they 
fail to extricate themselves. This progressive deterioration of the arguers’ emotional state 
is likely to result in more aggressive behaviour towards each other, which in turn is 
conducive of further disagreement. On the other hand, the subject may start developing 
the feeling that the other is being deliberately dense or difficult, and that he fails to see 
reason out of some form of malevolence. After all, you have witnessed my labours to 
rationally persuade you, so the fact that you do not yield to my view may indicate that 
you care more for your opinion than for my own sake. This can easily be construed as an 
ungrateful and aggressive attitude, especially if you are friend or kin—and this helps 
explaining why we usually quarrel more bitterly with people we care for, as opposed to 
utter strangers or enemies. From the latter we do not expect the same caring disposition 
that we consider suitable for the former (see also point (v) in section 3). 
 
                                                 
3 It goes without saying that eristic confrontation may often result in an escalation of disagreement between 
the parties, albeit this may also produce a cathartic effect which is ultimately beneficial (Walton 1998, pp. 
184-186). However, the point I am making here concerns argumentation in general, which can happen to 
fuel disagreement, rather than quench it, also when it is not embedded in eristic dialogues. 
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(3) Articulation factor. Insofar as arguing involves the giving and receiving of reasons, it 
multiplies the potential issues of disagreement. Indeed, it is a common experience that 
what is difficult to find while arguing is some common ground that both parties are 
willing to admit to. And even if this common ground is somehow established, the arguers 
will often try to put forward qualifications of their position to clarify why accepting such 
a common ground does not commit them to yielding to the opponent’s claim. The very 
fact that complex instances of argumentation involve scores of sub-arguments indicates 
that the original disagreement has birthed a huge offspring of sub-disagreements. 
Sometimes these new issues are minor and remain instrumental to the overall debate (e.g. 
whether the source I am quoting for support is reliable), but often they acquire greater 
importance than the original topic (e.g. whether you should trust my word on the matter 
at hand, rather than being sceptical of what I say), so they highjack the argumentation and 
turn it to other purposes. This is for instance what happens when so called “matters of 
principle” arise during a discussion on mundane issues. 
 This element can be given a more precise formulation in terms of probability, 
albeit here I will only provide a sketch of the idea. Let us assume that for any issue S 
there is a certain probability p that two subjects, X and Y, will disagree on it—that is, that 
X will believe S, while Y believes ¬S. The size of p depends on a variety of factors, most 
of which fall into four categories: evidential clarity, i.e. the more abundant, clear-cut, and 
unambiguous is the evidence about S available to both X and Y, the smaller p is; 
experiential homogeneity, i.e. the more X and Y share the same experiences about S, the 
smaller p is; cognitive similarity, i.e. the more X and Y share the same reasoning 
processes as far as S is concerned, the smaller p is; inherited disagreement, i.e. given 
another issue S' which both X and Y consider relevant to S, p is proportional to the 
probability p' that X and Y will disagree on S'. The last factor captures the fact that, if we 
disagree on whether Obama or McCain should be elected as President, it is more likely 
(albeit not necessary) that we disagree also on abortion rights and their extent. This is 
precisely the reason why articulation via argumentation increases the chances of 
disagreement: we start the discussion disagreeing on S, then proceed to consider other 
issues S', … , Sn that are relevant for S (and they need to be relevant, to avoid red 
herrings). Since we disagree on S, it is likely that we disagree also on S', … , Sn, thus by 
focusing on them we may uncover further reasons of dissent between us. Even if we 
subsequently manage to solve the original disagreement, it is perfectly possible that some 
sub-disagreements still survive: this is for instance what happens when we concede to the 
opponent that “he is right for the wrong reasons.” Notice that in this case the 
disagreement has been created (or, in most cases, uncovered) by the very act of arguing, 
thus sharpening not only our respective positions, but also the divide between them. 
 
(4) Socio-cultural factor. Taking at face value what is said is, in most social contexts, the 
‘right’ thing to do, i.e. what social conventions demand of people: if someone doubt your 
word on a given matter, the sceptic has better to produce some reason to back up that 
challenge, otherwise he will be labelled as unfriendly, rude, blunt, uncouth, opinionated, 
etc. This is partly due to the pragmatics of human communication:4 while accepting the 
                                                 
4 Here I endorse a Reidian view on trust in social testimony (Reid 1970): its applicability to argumentation 
is extensively discussed elsewhere (Paglieri 2007; Paglieri and Castelfranchi in press a; Paglieri, Woods in 
press), so here it will be taken for granted. Other supporters of the Reidian perspective, broadly construed, 
 5
FABIO PAGLIERI 
truth of what we are told does not require any further justification, other than the fact that 
we were told, doubting the information we receive from others must be justified, e.g. by 
the fact that we believe differently, or that the source is known to be unreliable or biased 
by some hidden agenda, etc. Arguing, either to persuade the opponent of some claim he 
does not yet endorse, or to refute the reasons provided by the proponent, implies 
challenging this default trust, and thus requires some justification, whereas the same is 
not true for lack of argument (e.g. directly assenting or keeping silent). 
 In addition to default trust in social testimony, also specific socio-cultural patterns 
contribute to determine the acceptability of argumentation across different contexts: 
arguing is more or less acceptable depending on the current social setting. For instance, 
scientific conferences are possibly the most argumentation-tolerant environments, 
whereas family meetings with elder relatives tend to be argumentation-intolerant 
situations. The fact that argumentation is culturally discouraged in certain contexts does 
not of course imply that people will not argue all the same in such contexts: whoever 
witnessed a family reunion turning into a nightmare of mutual accusations knows this as 
a fact. But cultural norms have a direct effect on the consequences of arguing: if you 
decide to argue in a situation where this is commonly considered inappropriate, you are 
fully aware that your act will constitute a breach of social protocol, whether you are right 
or not—and whether you manage to persuade the counterpart or not. The very fact that 
you are arguing, in spite of social conventions, constitutes a point of (possibly bitter) 
disagreement with all those that uphold such conventions. By way of example, consider a 
couple driving home after a dinner with the wife’s parents and some family friends, in 
which the husband got into a quarrel with his father-in-law and accused him of being 
despotic. Even if the wife completely agrees with her husband, she may well accuse him 
of having behaved very badly, on the ground that a formal dinner with family friends was 
not the appropriate occasion to discuss personal matters with her parents. Most 
importantly, she may be perfectly justified in her accusation, regardless the amount of 
reasons that support the husband’s view of his father-in-law: the point here is not who 
was right in the original argument, but rather whether it was appropriate to discuss the 
matter at all. So, in argument-intolerant situations, arguing is likely to expose the arguers 
to a specific form of disagreement, concerning the application of socio-cultural 
conventions on argumentation: beside disagreeing on the topic of discussion, the parties 
will probably also disagree on whether it is appropriate or not to have that discussion in 
the first place. 
 
3. PICKING YOUR FIGHTS: EXPECTATIONS OF AGREEMENT AND THE 
DECISION TO ARGUE 
 
These musings are not meant to suggest that argumentation is a hopeless endeavour, and 
that we should steer clear of it in view of its inherent risks. Who needs to be reminded of 
these risks are the theorists, not the arguers. In deciding whether to argue or not, we are 
naturally careful in “picking our fights,” precisely because we are aware of the costs and 
                                                                                                                                                 
include David Lewis (1969), Paul Grice (1989), and Alvin Goldman (1999), whereas Dan Sperber (2001) 
provides a thorough critique of it. For a general outlook on social epistemology, see Govier (1997; 1998), 
Goldman (1999), and Origgi (2004). 
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the dangers of argumentation, in particular for the sake of our social life.5 Nonetheless, 
we do pick some fights, because in the appropriate circumstances we consider it is worth 
taking the risk of arguing. But this prudent stance finds little space in most argumentation 
theories, where it is at best conceived as a sort of lamentable timidity in engaging in the 
noble art of argumentation. It is nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it contributes to the 
rationality of argumentative practice, precisely because argumentation is (also) a practice, 
and as such we need reasons to decide whether to engage in it or not. A cost/benefit 
analysis, couched in social terms, is one of these reasons, and a very important one, 
especially when dialogue aims to manage a difference of opinions between the parties. 
 Some of the considerations that enter such analysis have nothing to do with the 
level of agreement that argumentation is supposed to achieve. For instance, the efforts we 
expect to make in putting forward an argument are often crucial in deciding whether to 
argue or not. We do not argue when it is not worth it (Karunatillake and Jennings 2005), 
and, most importantly, we are rationally justified in doing so. Moreover, increasing 
agreement with the counterpart is not the only possible purpose of argumentation: in 
scientific inquiry, arguments are often driven by a desire to know more about the matter 
under consideration, regardless whether this results in greater consensus with colleagues 
(Walton 1998); indeed, the originality of one’s inquiry is often gauged in terms of how 
much it contrasts with other views, especially if these views are firmly established in the 
scientific community. As far as inquiry is concerned, disagreement may be more valuable 
than agreement, at least as a driving force. However, in what follows I confine myself to 
strategic considerations on when and why arguments can be expected to either favour or 
undermine agreement between the parties: for a more comprehensive cost/benefit 
analysis of argumentation, see Paglieri and Castelfranchi (in press b). 
 So the question now is when it is legitimate for the subject to expect that arguing 
will increase the level of agreement, and when instead it is reasonable to suppose that (i) 
argumentation will produce an escalation of disagreement and (ii) such escalation will 
have negative effects on the dialogical interaction. These are two different, albeit related 
concerns: the first refers to expectations on whether arguing will either quench or fuel the 
original disagreement, while the second includes expectations on how disagreement 
escalation may affect both one’s own agenda and the social interaction with his 
counterpart. Both aspects are important to decide whether to argue or not, and nine 
distinct types of considerations factor in this decision (the list is not necessarily complete, 
and the order does not reflect degrees of importance):6 
  
(i) Strength of one’s own arguments: the more confident I am of my reasons, the more 
inclined I should be to expect acceptance of them from my counterpart. Of course I may 
                                                 
5 Gilbert makes a similar point, when he observes that “no one argues without taking into account how she 
is perceived by her opponent, how she perceives him, and how the relationship will be maintained during 
and after the argumentation” (1999, p. 2). Notice that Gilbert here maintains that agreement is the main 
function of argumentation, and urges us to appreciate that such agreement is not just a matter of rational 
consensus on the truth of a proposition, but it rather calls for a multimodal approach to argumentation (see 
also Gilbert 1997). 
6 As noted in section 1, much of what follows bears a strong affinity with work done on argument editing 
(Hample, Dallinger 1990; 1992; Hample et al. 2009), albeit it refers to a different type of decision: editing 
is about assessing single arguments within a dialogical interaction the agent is already engaged in, while 
here I am discussing the decision to enter such an interaction in the first place. 
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be mistaken and overestimate the value of my arguments. But this is not the point: even if 
my assessment is incorrect, it will still influence my expectations on how well received 
my position will be (and should be) by the audience. All of us experience surprise and 
mild indignation when an argument that we consider irrefutable fails to elicit immediate 
agreement from the counterpart. In these circumstances, we feel much less inclined to 
accept the counterpart’s reservations as well-founded, and tend to be curt and “take things 
personally.” Escalation of disagreement is likely to result from these premises. Notice 
that argument strength here does not necessarily means deductive validity or inductive 
force, because also considerations of rhetorical efficacy enter the picture, as far as 
persuasion is at stake. Indeed, in order to achieve agreement what really counts is the fact 
that the argument is psychologically appealing for the counterpart: whether or not this 
depends on its formal quality, it is largely beside the point. 
 
(ii) Importance of the counterpart’s belief: if I know you to have very strong convictions 
on the matter of our disagreement, I will be pessimistic on the likelihood of changing 
your mind, and I will also fear that you might resent my attempts of inducing such 
change. Here the key factor is not so much the evidential force of the belief I aim to 
challenge, as much as its cognitive importance (Castelfranchi 1997; Paglieri 2004)—that 
is, how crucial and central is that particular view for your system of belief, so that if I 
prompt you to reconsider it, this will force you to revise many other convictions. People 
usually do not appreciate being compelled to undertake any mayor “paradigm shift,” not 
even if they are led to do so by rational persuasion, because (a) it takes a lot of effort to 
drastically revise one’s belief system, and (b) it leaves you with the feeling of having 
been deeply mistaken for a long time. Accordingly, we usually think twice before arguing 
about what we believe the counterpart to care most about, precisely because we suspect 
that, if we forced his hand without good motive, the reaction would be strongly negative 
and disagreement would escalate. 
 
(iii) Complexity of the issue under consideration: as mentioned in section 2, exploring an 
issue by arguing on it is likely to multiply the topics of potential disagreement between 
the parties. The more complex is the matter being debated, the more drastic this 
multiplication effect will be. This is the main reason why people are very prudent in 
entering debates on complex issues, and rightly so. As a case in point, take current 
academic discussion on the nature of consciousness: the topic was indicated by Science in 
2005 as the second biggest mystery to be addressed in the next 25 years, the first being 
the nature of the universe. The assessment was probably correct, since, as of today, 
philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists fail to agree on almost every aspect of 
the issue. Current items of heated debate include, among many others: What do we mean 
by “consciousness”? How many types of consciousness exist, and how they differ from 
each other? Is consciousness reducible to a physical phenomenon, or Cartesian dualism is 
the correct option? Can machines ever be conscious? Is phenomenal experience 
intrinsically subjective? Are phenomenological reports acceptable sources of information 
on consciousness? Is there any hope in the search for the neural correlates of 
consciousness, and how should we try looking for them? In light of the titanic proportion 
of the dispute, many philosophers (including philosophers of mind) carefully avoid 
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entering the arena, while those that are engaged in it so far managed to stimulate, rather 
than sedate, the level of disagreement.7 
 
(iv) Sensitivity of the issue under consideration: we are very reluctant to argue about 
topics that are sensitive for ourselves or the counterpart, or both. For instance, only the 
most foolhardy husband will engage his wife in a debate on what is best to do during 
childbirth. This depends not only on a desire to avoid harming or being harmed, but also 
on an interest in preventing disagreement escalation. Since breaching certain topics can 
be painful, and since this fact is often know to both parties, arguing about such topics is 
easily construed as a deliberate aggression, cruelly aimed at the counterpart’s “soft spot.” 
This is likely to make the parties deaf to reason and turn even the most amicable 
suggestion into a fight.  
 
(v) Expectations of the counterpart: depending on what social attitude we believe the 
other to expect from us, we gauge differently the appropriateness of arguing with him. 
Considerations of friendship or kinship are a good example: we often justify our 
reluctance to argue with friends and family by a desire not to hurt their feelings. But why 
should their feelings be intrinsically more important to us than those of any other fellow 
human being? I suggest they are not. Rather, our reluctance is motivated by the fact that 
friends and family are expecting “more agreement” from us than what is anticipated from 
(and by) strangers. After all, we are part of the same social group, and what defines us as 
members is the sharing of certain convictions, plus a more or less explicit convention not 
to hurt each other. So the feelings of friends and relatives are more easily hurt by arguing, 
because open disagreement could be construed as a betrayal of legitimate social 
expectations, and not because arguing in itself is especially hurtful. I was expecting your 
approval, and the fact that it is denied to me breaks this expectation, thus producing a 
certain amount of pain, disquiet, or discomfort. A stranger, lacking any specific 
expectation on whether you share his views or not, is much less vulnerable by your 
disagreement with him. 
 
(vi) Domain of discourse: depending on the content of what is being debated, a higher or 
lower level of disagreement may result socially tolerable. Matters of taste, for instance, 
usually allow much more disagreement than any discussion on more objective issues. 
There is a mild irony here: if it is true, as for the Latin maxim, that de gustibus non 
disputandum est (tastes are not to be disputed), how come we debate so often on matters 
of personal taste, e.g. on the perceived quality of a certain book, movie, song, or opera? 
Personal tastes are so frequently disputed precisely because they are not disputable, in the 
sense that people cannot be forced to change their aesthetic preferences, thus they feel 
relatively safe in discussing them. The subjective nature of personal tastes provides a 
shelter for anyone that would be hard pressed to answer objections on matters of fact. In 
other words, in discussing tastes we are usually free to disagree with each other, without 
having to assign any blame (moral, epistemic, or otherwise) to people we disagree with 
                                                 
7 Obviously, disagreement in philosophical or scientific debate may be very valuable, as noted before. 
Indeed, the sustained debate in consciousness studies produced significant breakthroughs in our 
understanding of how the mind works. But the fact remains that argumentation on complex issues does not 
typically reduce disagreement, whether or not this happens to be a good thing. 
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(see also Kölbel 2003). This reduces our concerns on escalation of disagreement, thus 
making us more inclined to arguing on these issues. 
 
(vii) Dialogical goal of the interaction: as already noted in section 2, different types of 
dialogue assign a different role to agreement or disagreement, depending on the common 
dialogical goal, or function, that characterizes that typology (here, as elsewhere, I follow 
Walton’s taxonomy, 1998). For instance, inquiry not only tolerates, but also actively 
promotes disagreement, since consensus is not intrinsically valuable in this context 
(although it can be needed to locally confirm the validity of a given hypothesis or theory), 
whereas disagreement is instrumental to breed original ideas and invite considering new 
problems with novel methods. On the contrary, disagreement is destructive of persuasion 
dialogues: when attempts at rational persuasion result in an escalation of disagreement, 
this indicates that something has gone very badly in the argumentative interaction, at least 
from the standpoint of the persuader. This suggests that the decision to argue or not is 
sensitive to the kind of dialogical interaction the arguers expect and/or want to produce.  
 
(viii) Power relations between the arguers: by and large, it is a good rule-of-thumb to 
avoid getting into a fight with your boss, unless it is strictly necessary. Sure, she or he 
may welcome the challenge and appreciate your outspoken attitude as a sign of courage 
and moral fibre, as it happens so often in Hollywood movies. Unfortunately, in real life 
chances are that you will be fired, demoted, punished, or at least diminished in the eyes of 
the person who has most influence on your career. Let us be clear: to avoid picking fights 
is not the same as to curtail favour with all manners of servile attitude. It is rather a matter 
of acknowledging that having power over you also entails an expectation on your 
tendency to argue, and that this expectation is justified. The expectation is that you will 
argue only with very good cause (i.e. more than what would be needed otherwise), and 
two reasons justify such expectation. First, arguing with leaders is intrinsically subversive 
of the existing power structure, since it usually entails suggesting that you are right and 
they are wrong. But that power structure is valuable, both for the leaders and for the 
whole social group, so the fact that you are right is not enough to justify your 
argumentative attitude—it must also be the case that showing that you are right achieves 
some further purpose (e.g. the welfare of the company or of the tribe), other than your 
personal satisfaction. Second, leaders typically have to fight to first win and then keep 
their position: insofar as arguing challenge their competence on the matter under 
discussion, it could be interpreted as an attack to their authority, especially if the 
argumentation is conducted publicly (see next point). Whenever this happens, the leader 
has to retaliate in order to preserve the status quo, even if, in different circumstances, he 
or she would be willing to admit of having been in the wrong. Both facts increase the 
likelihood that arguing with “people in high places” will fuel further disagreement, and 
put the arguer in a very difficult position: hence we all tend to tread lightly in these cases. 
 
(ix) Level of publicity of the dispute: we rarely expect people to admit their faults in 
public, and this applies also to arguments. If you aim at peacefully resolving a dispute, it 
is better trying to settle it in private, rather than dragging the counterpart in a court of 
law—or in any other public arena, for that matter. Disagreements are better kept private 
for obvious reasons: being right and being able to prove it is considered indicative of 
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many positive qualities, such as lucidity of judgment, strength of character, clarity of 
reasoning, inventiveness, and fluency. On the contrary, argumentative failure is taken to 
show lack of these desirable features, and this is something we definitely do not want the 
general public to witness. Indeed, we would be happy to showcase our argumentative 
triumphs, if only there was no danger of making our dialectical debacles equally 
manifest. But there is such a danger, so caution suggests keeping our disagreements as 
private as possible, to avoid devastating effects on our reputation as rational agents. 
Clearly, this tendency is modulated by personality traits: extroverted and self-confident 
people will be less preoccupied of making fools of themselves, and thus more ready to 
argue in public, whereas introverted and insecure characters will strongly prefer private 
disputes. This in turn affects expectations of disagreement: if forced to publicly argue 
against his will, your counterpart will probably become so headstrong as to border 
irrationality, simply because he would rather die than publicly admit he is wrong. In 
contrast, engaging that person in private debate on the same issue, you would have no 
problem settling the matter quickly and peacefully. Avoiding escalation of disagreement 
is the reason that motivate our tendency to argue in private, especially if the initial 
positions differ sharply and the matter is sensitive.  
 
4. THE QUARRELSOME COMPUTER: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGUMENTATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Finally, greater awareness of the dangers of arguing is crucial for technological 
applications of argumentation theories. This is a vibrant field of research in Artificial 
Intelligence (for a recent survey, see Bench-Capon, Dunne 2007), as witnessed by several 
scientific meetings (the workshop series ArgMAS, CMNA, Persuasive Technologies, and 
since 2006 the large-scale biennial conference COMMA), publications (aside from the 
proceedings of the conferences just mentioned, see also Reed, Norman 2004, Walton 
2005, the special issue of Artificial Intelligence edited by Trevor Bench-Capon and Paul 
Dunne in 2007, and the new journal Argumentation & Computation forthcoming in 2010 
by Taylor-Francis), and large-scale research projects (e.g. ASPIC - Argument Service 
Platform with Integrated Component, http://www.argumentation.org/, and the support 
COST action on Agreement Technologies, http://www.agreement-technologies.org/). 
Broadly speaking, the relevance of argumentation theories for AI is twofold, spanning 
both programming issues and human-computer interactions. Concerning computer 
programs and protocols, especially in distributed systems, argumentation techniques are 
used to guarantee a good balance between flexibility and stability: each software agent is 
endowed with more or less sophisticated argumentative skills to interact with other agents 
and solve specific problems, e.g. information retrieval, automated decision-making, 
negotiation, etc. As far as interfaces are concerned, argumentation theories provide 
inspiration on how to design dialogue systems that human users will perceive as natural 
and convincing, and that will be able to engage in conversations of non-trivial 
complexity, e.g. providing appropriate replies, asking pertinent questions, offering 
suggestions in light of the user’s needs and tastes, etc. 
 As discussed above, the assumption “more argument, more agreement” is 
mistaken as a general rule: in addition, it may also be very misleading, when it comes to 
argument technologies. Let us start from the application of argument theories to 
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communities of artificial agents interacting with each other. These agents typically have 
no special concern for their personal emotional welfare, and they do not care for social 
image and for being in good terms with their fellows: indeed, they have no feelings that 
can be hurt, so there is nothing personal at stake in their interactions. Nonetheless, their 
decision to engage in argumentation is still affected by (i) energetic constraints, so that 
they should not pursue argumentation if the expected benefits are lower than the likely 
costs (Karunatillake and Jennings 2005; Paglieri and Castelfranchi in press b), and (ii) the 
risks of articulation, since exploring at length a given issue may lead to multiply the 
points of disagreement between different artificial agents. In this case, articulation does 
not threaten to worsen the mood of the arguers, since they have none, but it may lead to 
computational inefficiency: if the agents lose themselves in the subtleties of prolonged 
debate, the performance of the system as a whole will be slowed or sidetracked, and this 
is something both programmers and users are keen to avoid. The right rule in this case is 
to incorporate strategic considerations in the agent’s decision to either argue or let the 
matter rest, and these considerations should somehow approximate those discussed in 
section 2: evidential clarity, experiential homogeneity, cognitive similarity, and inherited 
disagreement. 
 Acknowledging the dangers of disagreement escalation is even more important 
when it comes to design users’ interfaces based on argumentation technologies. In this 
area, it is paramount that the interface is capable of eliciting agreement in its users, both 
as a baseline to ensure smooth interaction in general (users should not get mad at the 
program), and concerning specific functionalities of the system (users should be willing 
to accept or at least consider the system’s suggestions). The former type of agreement is 
instrumental to the latter, especially in those cases where (i) the software is supposed to 
make decisions or suggestions in the best interest of the user, and (ii) this may not always 
coincide with what the user would do left to his own devices. Expert systems capable of 
supporting human decision-making constitute very promising applications in AI, but they 
need to be designed keeping in mind the users’ argumentative attitudes. In particular, 
users should not be subjected to questioning or correction unless this is strictly 
necessary—and here “necessary” means not only that the user may be about to make a 
mistake, but also that such a mistake is of some relevance. In human-computer 
interaction, it is of the outmost importance to include an “agreement strategic manager” 
as part of the artificial system, to ensure that the user is not bothered all the time with 
puny arguments or fastidious suggestions, and he is instead best prepared to keep an 
open-minded attitude towards the system’s indications when these are truly relevant. In 
short, a computer should not be designed to be quarrelsome or pedantic, lest it end up like 
the Talking Cricket in The Adventures of Pinocchio, with an infuriated user throwing a 




This paper illustrates the dangers of fuelling disagreement that are inherent in 
argumentation. After criticizing the idea that argumentative failure simply leaves 
unchanged some pre-existing difference of opinions (section 1), I described four factors 
that may cause a more ruinous outcome, i.e. disagreement escalation. The factors 
considered include epistemological norms of reasonableness, increasing costs of 
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prolonged debate, level of articulation of the issue under discussion, and socio-cultural 
expectations of the arguers on each other attitudes (section 2). I insisted that subjects 
decide whether to argue or not also on the ground of strategic considerations about (i) the 
likely effect of argumentation on the level of disagreement, and (ii) the consequences that 
an increase in disagreement might have on their social relation and personal concerns. 
Nine relevant elements that may factor in this decision were discussed in section 3: 
strength of one’s own arguments, importance of the counterpart’s belief, complexity and 
sensitivity of the issue under consideration, expectations of the counterpart, domain of 
discourse, dialogical goal of the interaction, power relations between the arguers, and 
level of publicity of the dispute. Finally, section 4 briefly considered the consequences of 
this view for technological applications of argumentation theories. 
 As mentioned before, stressing the dangers of disagreement escalation is not the 
same as endorsing a bleak outlook on the chances of reaching agreement via 
argumentation. On the contrary, I believe that arguing is often effective in solving 
disputes and differences of opinion by means of rational persuasion, rather than resorting 
to violence or simply refusing to engage in any form of confrontation. Nonetheless, the 
efficacy of argumentation may be undermined by using it too often and in the wrong 
circumstances, very much like the sharpness of a scalpel is dulled by using it to cut steaks 
at the dinner table. My suggestion is that the arguers’ sensitivity to dangers of 
disagreement escalation is attuned to detect potential misuses of argumentation, and thus 
avoid them. Of course, this is not a perfect diagnostic instrument: sometimes our 
reluctance to engage in “dangerous arguments” is due to our own weaknesses (of 
character, of reasoning, or both), while in other cases the escalation of disagreement is 
not justified by any reasonable factor, but only depends on the dialectic shortcomings of 
the arguers (e.g., they may be short-tempered, or trying to cover their poor arguments 
with a show of indignation). However, imperfect as it may be, sensitivity to disagreement 
still remains a useful compass in orienting the arguers’ strategic decision-making, as 
several examples discussed in this paper tried to clarify. 
 Needless to say, much work is yet to be done in this line of research. The picture I 
outlined here is not necessarily complete or correct. As for completeness, the list of 
factors determining disagreement escalation, and the catalogue of issues considered by 
arguers in their decision are open to further integration and amendment. Correctness, on 
the other hand, will be decided largely on empirical grounds, by carefully observing real-
life argumentative practices and further probing the speakers’ intuitions about such 
practices. Interestingly, the two aspects do not need to coincide: it may well be that some 
factors affect our decision to argue or not with other people (e.g., reluctance to challenge 
someone in a position of power over us), and yet we resist explicitly acknowledging this 
influence when asked about our argumentative attitudes. That is, arguers may be unaware 
of (or unwilling to discuss) some key aspects of their decision-making. Disentangling 
these features and designing effective ways to investigate them empirically is left to 
future work. My aim here was more modest, but also instrumental to these larger 
concerns: if we fail to acknowledge in principle the deep connection between 
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